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THE INDETERMINACY OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS IN THE AGE OF THE FRAMERS
WILLIAM B. GwYN*
"[W]hat happened to separation of powers notions as the fram-
ers' generation and the government during Washington's presi-
dency faced practical problems of governmental organization and
the conduct of government[?]" 1 Professor Casper's answer to this
central question of his essay is very similar to that given us in re-
cent years by Louis Fisher, another close student of the period.2
Both the framers and the men participating in the first administra-
tion under the new Constitution (often, of course, the same per-
sons) were concerned more with improving the efficiency and capa-
bilities of the national government than with creating a system of
government based on the abstract maxims of political philoso-
phers. As Fisher put it, when the framers referred to foreign writ-
ers such as Montesquieu, "they did so to embellish an argument,
not to prove it. The argument itself was grounded on what had
been learned at home. Theory played a role, but it was always cir-
cumscribed and tested by experience. '' Professor Casper reveals to
us the same practical, nondoctrinaire men operating the new gov-
ernmental institutions. Politics and concern for efficiency were far
more important in determining governmental procedures in the
Washington administration than theories of government. In Cas-
per's words, "[s]eparation of powers notions played a supportive
role, but the views expressed were not doctrinaire; in part because
there was no clear doctrine."4
This latter point is especially important and is the subject of my
comment. From the time when the idea of separation of powers
* Professor of Political Science, Tulane University.
1. Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989).
2. See L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY (1972).
3. Id. at 4-5.
4. Casper, supra note 1, at 261. Maeva Marcus's Comment on Casper's essay comes to
much the same conclusion about the Justices of the Supreme Court at this time. Marcus,
Separation of Powers in the Early National Period, 30 W i. & MARY L. REv. 269 (1989).
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first became popular in North America, much disagreement pre-
vailed as to what institutional arrangements would satisfy the doc-
trine. The first state constitutions were said to incorporate a
proper separation but were attacked immediately for not doing so.
Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution were criti-
cized for not satisfying the doctrine, although it was not long
before the latter was being extolled as the definitive manifestation
of the separation of powers. This absence of agreement about the
institutional arrangements required by the doctrine probably en-
couraged its use as a rhetorical weapon with which to belabor po-
litical opponents or legitimize one's own constitutional preferences,
rather than as a clear guide for the construction of a safe and effec-
tive system of government. Such absence of agreement was not
confined to the United States, for it occurred also in seventeenth-
century England when the doctrine was first articulated and con-
tinues in our own century with respect to forms of government dif-
ferent from our own.5 Disagreement about the doctrine is probably
inherent because, as stated in The Federalist No. 47,6 a large vari-
ety of institutional arrangements can satisfy the separation of pow-
ers norm. The most extreme embodiment is not necessarily the
best, for it might reduce the achievement of other values.
Most late eighteenth-century American accounts of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine were very superficial. Rarely does one find
an explanation for why such a separation is desirable beyond vague
references to its necessity in achieving "liberty" and avoiding "tyr-
anny," two highly emotive words dear to eighteenth-century An-
glo-American rhetoric. In contrast, the seventeenth-century En-
glishmen who first urged a separation of legislative and executive
power had fairly clear objectives in mind: to limit government offi-
cials by legal rules (the "rule of law"), to provide for the accounta-
bility of government officials, to eliminate a powerful group bias
(that of government officials) from the legislature, to allow for gov-
ernmental checks and balances, and to promote government effi-
5. See W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 37-65 (1965); Gwyn, The
Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of Democratic Government, in SEPARATION OF
POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 65 (R. Goldwin & A. Kaufman eds. 1986).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
7. See Gwyn, The Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of Democratic Government,
supra note 5, at 66.
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ciency.8 As public statements during the late eighteenth century
indicate, Americans often lost sight of these reasons for not al-
lowing the same people to exercise legislative, executive, and judi-
cial powers.
Professor Casper limits his essay to a historical narrative of as-
pects of American government in the age of the framers relevant to
separation of powers issues. In his own words, he makes no at-
tempt "to question modern constitutional law and its interpreta-
tions from a historical vantage point."9 I wish he had, for surely
the events he describes have important implications for American
lawyers and judges when applying the separation of powers doc-
trine today. Let me suggest two implications, the first briefly, the
second at somewhat greater length.
First, the absence of a clear articulation of the separation of
powers doctrine leads modern courts to apply the doctrine without
understanding its purposes. As in the days of the framers and pos-
sibly in part as a result of the superficiality of thinking about the
separation of powers at that time, lawyers and judges today con-
tinue to invoke the doctrine without indicating either the intended
goals of the separation or the range of institutional arrangements
that might satisfy the doctrine. Without an idea of the values to be
maximized by separating the exercise of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers, intelligent discussion about the institutional
means for achieving the values is impossible. Ironically, a doctrine
conceived originally to minimize partiality in government and to
assure the accountability of executive officials was used recently to
frustrate efforts to attain those objectives through the use of spe-
cial prosecutors appointed by the judiciary, rather than by the
branch of government suspected of breaking the law.10
Second, from the time of the framers, the distinction between
legislative, executive, and judicial powers has been inexact and
highly misleading. Professor Casper reminds us that the doctrine
of the separation of powers is not stated explicitly in the Constitu-
tion,1 and that the Senate defeated later efforts to include it in
8. See id. at 68-70.
9. Casper, supra note 1, at 212.
10. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (challenge to the constitutionality of the
Ethics in Government Act).
11. Casper, supra note 1, at 221.
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the Bill of Rights.12 Nevertheless, commentators frequently main-
tain that the doctrine is implied in the first three articles, in which
Congress is given "[a]ll legislative powers" granted in the Constitu-
tion,13 the "executive power" is vested in the President,14 and the
"judicial power of the United States" is vested in the Supreme
Court and inferior courts created by Congress.' 5 What the Consti-
tution does not tell us is the meaning of the terms "legislative,"
"executive," and "judicial power."
The framers clearly were not functioning as political theorists,
carefully distinguishing each type of power. Nor were they relying
solely on the traditional British understanding of governmental ac-
tivities considered legislative or executive.' 6 Yet the framers and
their English forbearers did share the view that legislative power
involved much more than simply enacting general legal rules and
that executive power involved immensely more than executing
those rules. Indeed, during the seventeenth century, the term "ex-
ecutive power" usually included what has been labeled "judicial
power" since the eighteenth century.'7 Furthermore, the terms
"legislative power" and "executive power," which date in English
only from the seventeenth century, were coined to refer, not to sin-
gle governmental functions, but to the variety of functions exer-
cised by the two houses of Parliament on the one hand and those
exercised by the monarch, his officials, and his advisers, on the
other hand. Executive power was then, as it remains today, partic-
ularly multifunctional. As Herman Finer observed, the executive is
the "residuary legatee in government after other claimants like
Parliament and the law courts have taken their share."18 Finer's
12. Id. at 222. Had it been adopted, Madison's proposed amendment would not have
helped contemporary courts interpret the Constitution in terms of the separation of powers,
for it in effect merely said that each branch of government could exercise only those powers
granted to it by the Constitution. See id. at 221.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
14. Id. art. II, § 1.
15. Id. art. III, § 1.
16. For example, the framers gave to Congress as part of its legislative function powers
such as declaring war and coining money, which in England were part of the King's execu-
tive prerogatives.
17. See W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 5, at 5.
18. H. FINER, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT 575 (1949). For a perceptive
discussion of the problems of defining "executive" which concludes by taking Finer's ap-
proach, see King, Executives, in 5 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 173 (1975).
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point was that the monarch originally held all governmental power.
Over the years, autonomous institutions, including the houses of
Parliament and the law courts, took over certain of his powers.
Everything that remained, including some authority to make laws,
came to be termed "executive power." The residuary character of
this term would not, in itself, have caused problems of definitional
indeterminacy had "legislative" and "judicial" powers been defined
in terms of single governmental functions. The concept of legisla-
tive powers that we inherited from England, however, was itself
multifunctional, and, in addition to making laws, included taxa-
tion, appropriation of public funds, and impeachment and trial of
officials accused of abusing their authority. Additionally, as we
have seen, the framers further expanded the scope of legislative
powers and at times, as in the case of the appointing power, were
extremely uncertain as to which branch to assign a particular gov-
ernmental function."9
The framers and their predecessors perceived legislative powers
as appropriate for a deliberative elected assembly of equal mem-
bers and viewed executive power as appropriate for a hierarchically
organized institution with a single person or small council at the
apex. However, a consensus has never existed as to which govern-
ment actions belong to each type of organization. In some cases,
whether a function is given either to the legislative or to the execu-
tive branch probably has no bearing on the quality of government.
In other cases, however, the allocation of an activity to one branch
of government rather than to another could be critical to maintain-
ing the rule of law, the accountability of officials, and the efficiency
of government. Concern for the achievement of such objectives led
to demands for the separation of powers. One would hope that if
our courts employ that doctrine at all-and it would probably be
no loss if they did not-they do so in the same manner as its sev-
enteenth-century authors rather than with the formalism that
President Verkuil deplores in his contribution to this symposium.20
Given the indeterminate scope of legislative, executive, and judicial
19. See Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1061-70 (1987).
20. See Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence,
30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301 (1989).
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powers that has existed historically, judges should have little confi-
dence in their ability to assign various governmental activities to
one or another of these three categories.
